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to ======================================= The Other Side of the Story [16 February 2002] ======================================= On May 22, 1999, two months after the start of NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor of the ICTY, brought a so-called indictment against Yugoslav leaders. Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojiljkovic were accused of “crimes against humanity and violations of laws and customs of war.” Prior to the NATO aggression, there was a systematic anti-Serb campaign which accused the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije or VJ) and police forces of “excessive force and repression against the Albanian civilian population.” Since this campaign preceded the NATO aggression, had it been based on fact, then an indictment of the top Yugoslav leadership for “crimes against humanity…” would have been announced several months before the start of NATO bombing. This is especially true since the NATO Council’s decision to initiate air and missile strikes against FRY was publicly explained as a “humanitarian operation,” with the basic objective of dealing with a “humanitarian disaster” that supposedly preceded the NATO aggression. The indictment (Paragraph 25) claims that by October 1998, due to “a campaign of shelling predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns and villages,” some 300,000 people (15% of the total population) were displaced in Kosovo-Metohija. This is utterly untrue on many counts. The Yugoslav Army (VJ) did conduct anti-terrorist operations in Kosovo-Metohija from July 25 to September 28, 1998. These resulted in combat casualties among the terrorists as well as some movement of civilians. However that movement was not caused by expulsions by the VJ or by the shelling of towns and villages. In some cases, it involved the spontaneous flight of civilians from areas of combat. In other cases, civilians were ordered to leave their homes by secessionist leaders supported by foreign powers. The aim: to stage a “humanitarian disaster” to justify NATO bombing. Secondly, the indictment uses the loaded term “shelling.” In doing this, the ICTY consciously disregards the fact that, with the exception of Orahovac, no town or village in Kosovo-Metohija could have been a target of artillery bombardment during 1998 because there were no terrorist operations in these towns and villages during that year. Only Orahovac (July 18-20, 1998) saw a sizeable counter-terrorist operation. The purpose was to free Serbian civilians held hostage by the terrorists and subjected to violence and murder and to free 134 officers of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) under siege in two buildings. Moreover, no anti-terrorist action during 1998 involved “shelling” of inhabited areas because the Yugoslav Army (VJ) Command specifically forbade such actions in its operational orders. (For details, see the refutation of Paragraph 25 further below). There was no “humanitarian disaster” in Kosovo-Metohija in 1998. Even those civilians who temporarily fled combat operations or established refugee columns and camps on “KLA” orders, returned to their homes and settlements at the end of anti-terrorist operations. Thanks to the great efforts of the Serbian State and the FRY, no Albanian family in Kosovo-Metohija, as well as families of other ethnicities, had to face the winter of 1998-99 without housing. The media campaign claiming a “humanitarian disaster” that supposedly had already happened by the end of 1998 was manufactured in order to prepare the international community for the upcoming NATO aggression against Serbia and FRY On the grounds that its purposes were humanitarian, the massive bombing was code-named “Merciful Angel.” But the fact that Slobodan Milosevic and his associates were not indicted until close to the end of the NATO aggression points to motives of a non-angelic nature. U.S. political and military leaders, especially Madeleine Albright and Gen. Wesley Clark, publicly boasted that Yugoslav defense forces would capitulate after two or three days of massive air strikes. The Yugoslav political and military leadership would bow to the Rambouillet ultimatum it had previously rejected. (Appendix B of the Rambouillet "agreement" gave NATO the right to virtually occupy all of Yugoslavia. But the leaders didn't capitulate even after two months of round-the-clock strikes against civilian and also military objectives throughout the FR Yugoslavia. The will of the people to resist grew parallel to the death toll and infrastructure devastation. VJ and Serbian security forces could not hope to militarily defeat a greatly superior enemy, whose economic potential according to some estimates was some 676 greater than that of FRY, sapped by a decade of embargoes and blockades. Yet its heroic defense and the moral support of the entire population caused significant losses to the enemy, while the Yugoslav Army suffered minimal casualties. Yugoslavia emerged from this greatly unequal contest as the moral winner. This unexpected outcome of the NATO aggression disturbed its creators. Blackmail, a decade of blockades and embargoes, media demonization and finally, the 78 days of air and missile strikes against 995 targets in Yugoslavia were not enough to force the capitulation of the country and its armed forces. That is why the North Atlantic Council and the U.S. government decided to declare Yugoslavia’s military and civilian leaders war criminals, thus attempting to mask the general impression of failure, and the responsibility of NATO for atrocities. Convictions and long sentences would send a powerful message to the next victims of aggression: do not even try to resist or the same fate will befall you. Therefore, the ICTY indictment’s goal is not to prosecute real criminals, but to punish the defiance of those who refuse to submit to foreign Imperial forces driving towards a new world order [Novus Ordo Seclorum]. From the standpoint of future armed interventions by NATO and the U.S., their planners could not allow the Yugoslav model of decade-long resistance – and especially the model of defending against 78-days of air and missile strikes, combined with multiple land attacks from Albania, in early 1999 – to become an attractive model for defense doctrines in other small countries, aiming to preserve their national identity, liberty and independence. Following is the so-called Indictment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanica and Vlajko Stojiljkovica, for «crimes against Humanity and violations of laws and customs of war», along with the factual refutation of the allegations and incriminations listed therein, paragraph by paragraph. |
| Paragraph 1 of the Indictment gives general geographical and political information about Kosovo-Metohija and its immediate surroundings, to which we have no objections. Paragraph 2 of the Indictment states: “In 1990 the Socialist Republic of Serbia promulgated a new Constitution which, among other things, changed the names of the republic and the autonomous provinces. The name of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was changed to the Republic of Serbia (both hereinafter Serbia); the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was changed to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (both hereinafter Kosovo); and the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was changed to the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (hereinafter Vojvodina). During this same period, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro changed its name to the Republic of Montenegro (hereinafter Montenegro).” COMMENT: The reasons for and character of the 1990 constitutional changes in Serbia will be discussed in subsequent counts. All paragraph 2 does is establish that all the republics and provinces of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) struck the attribute “Socialist” from their name. Yet this assertion can in no way be related to the indicted, and thus does not belong in the indictment. Given the undeniable ideological bent and the clearly stated political objectives of the ICTY, this count would appear more favorable to proving the defendants’ innocence than their guilt. But as most of them were not in significant positions of authority in Serbia and Yugoslavia at the time of the 1990 constitutional changes, any connection between them and such changes – positive or negative – is out of place Paragraph 3 of the Indictment says: “In 1974, a new SFRY Constitution provided for a devolution of power from the central government to the six constituent republics of the country. Within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given considerable autonomy including control of their educational systems, judiciary, and police. They were also given their own provincial assemblies, and were represented in the Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the Presidency of the SFRY.” COMMENT: According to all the Constitutions of Second Yugoslavia (SFRY), Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija had certain autonomous rights, which had been constantly expanded as the country and its political system evolved. In the amendments to the 1968 and 1974 Constitution, those rights elevated these Provinces to the level of “constituent components of the Federation.” These constitutional changes significantly limited the sovereignty of SFRY and the Republic of Serbia. Serbia’s sovereignty had dual limitations – on one side, just like the other Republics, because its Constitution was subordinate to that of the Federation; but on the other, the Provinces had a say in Serbia's Constitution. Yet the provinces had no such restrictions in promulgating their own Constitutions. Thus it ensued that the Provinces were more sovereign than the Federation, since Serbia had no say in the Constitutions of Provinces ostensibly within its territory. This count of the indictment is misleading and essentially untrue. Even before the 1974 Constitution, the Republics of the SFRY (all six) had substantial authority and autonomy in their internal affairs. This was especially true following the 1963 Constitution. Also, the Autonomous Provinces within the Republic of Serbia existed before the 1974 SFRY Constitution. The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija were already established during the Liberation War [the anti-Fascist resistance during World War II], as part of the administrative and territorial division of the antifascist movement. The first Constitution of the Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (DFRY), in January 1946, determined that the People’s Republic of Serbia included the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija. Subsequently, the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija was also upgraded to the status of Province, but also within Serbia. Both provinces had their governments and administrative bodies long before the Constitution of 1974. Amendments to the 1963 SFRY (Amendments XX, XXXII and XLI, adopted June 30, 1971, and included fully in the 1974 SFRY Constitution) made the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija “constituent elements” of the Yugoslav federation. This constitutional change and the subsequent practice of both provinces have made them de facto and de iure federal components. This status put them practically outside of Serbia, and in some fundamental issues they had greater authority than the Republic of Serbia, even though they were theoretically still its components. For example, “changes to the SFRY Constitution can be adopted when the wording proposed by the Federal Parliament is ratified by the Parliaments of all Republics and all Autonomous Provinces... [But] if the Parliament of one or more Republics or Autonomous Province do not ratify the changes to the SFRY Constitution adopted by the Federal Parliament, the proposed Constitutional amendments… cannot be [returned] on the Parliamentary agenda before one year expires...” (XXXII amendment). On top of all that, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija had representatives on all levels of government in Serbia and the Federation, while Serbia had no prerogatives relating to the governments and administration of «its own» provinces. Such a degree of provincial authority substantially infringed on the sovereignty of Serbia. It proved to be absurd in both the theory and practice of federalism, and had to be changed. That led to changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which did not infringe in any way on the Federal Constitution, but took place under Section IV of the Serbian Constitution. These amendments, among other things, regulated the following: * “Changes to the Serbian Constitution will be made by the Parliament of Serbia. If changes to the Serbian Constitution relate to the issues of the entire republic, the Parliament of Serbia will make its decision with the agreement of provincial Parliaments.” (Article 427). * “The Parliament of Serbia, after a public debate, establishes the proposed amendments to the Serbian Constitution relating to issues of interest to the entire Republic. The Parliament of Serbia then votes [on the amendments] with the agreement of provincial Parliaments. Changes to the Serbian Constitution are adopted in the Serbian Parliament if two-thirds of all delegates in the Parliament of Serbia votes in their favor.” (Article 430). Paragraph 4 of the Indictment says: “In 1981, the last census with near universal participation, the total population of Kosovo was approximately 1,585,000 of which 1,227,000 (77%) were Albanians and 210,000 (13%) were Serbs. Only estimates for the population of Kosovo in 1991 are available because Kosovo Albanians boycotted the census administered that year. General estimates are that the current population of Kosovo is between 1,800,000 and 2,100,000 of which approximately 85-90% are Kosovo Albanians and 5-10% are Serbs.” It is misleading and scientifically inaccurate to consider the ethnic makeup of any region in the world, including Kosovo-Metohija, exclusively in the light of the last comprehensive Census, only 20 years old. The historical right of an indigenous people to ancestral territory cannot be determined solely on the basis of the last Census, completely neglecting the reasons for that people shrinking in numbers from an indisputable majority to a marginal minority. Any previous Census would have pointed to a different ethnic makeup of Kosovo-Metohija than what is stated in this Indictment, since this region is historically, culturally, spiritually and in all ways a center of the Serbian civilization and state. Anthropological and ethnological research on the Medieval period (1455), indicates that, for example, the central Kosovo-Metohija area of Drenica had a total of 1,900 households, of which 1,873 were Serb and only 10 Albanian. The censuses from 1921 and 1931 also indicate that Albanians were not a majority in this region. At the peak of Medieval Serbia’s economic and cultural prosperity, its capital was in the Kosovo-Metohija city of Prizren; at the time, it was one of the largest cities in the Balkans, with 60,000 inhabitants. The belief of Serbs – and not just the Orthodox clergy – that Kosovo is the “Serb Jerusalem” is not unfounded. Without Kosovo-Metohija, Serbs would not be who they are – they would cease being a historical nation, and become an amorphous demographic mass. The Albanian character of Kosovo-Metohija emphasized by the Indictment is not a legitimate consequence of the natural disappearance of Serbs and the natural population growth of local Albanians. Forced Albanization began with the Islamization of the local populace during the Turkish occupation and has continued to the present day, always as a function of conquest and occupation by foreign powers. In addition to Albanization, the majority Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija have been systematic targets of expulsion and terror, until they were reduced to the proportions on which the ICTY Indictment is based. With regard to elementary justice such an essentially genocidal change of ethnic makeup in Kosovo-Metohija cannot be considered valid. It is generally understood in the legal science that changes achieved by force are considered null and void.
Paragraph 5 of the Indictment says: “During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern about discrimination against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government while Kosovo Albanians voiced concern about economic underdevelopment and called for greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations which were suppressed by SFRY military and police forces of Serbia.” COMMENT: Serb “concern” over discrimination by the “Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government” is much older, and has involved much more than mere concern. The issue here is an expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija which began in the latter half of 1960 after the Fourth Plenary session (the Brioni plenum) of the Yugoslav League of Communists (SKJ). During the 1980s, after the death of J.B. Tito, the expulsions intensified, and were manifested in a variety of ways calculated to cause the mass exodus of Serbs from the province. According to expert though still incomplete analyses of the available data, it is estimated that over 200,000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo-Metohija from mid-1960 to 1981, under various circumstances, commonly under pressure. The Albanian majority in Kosovo (77% per the Indictment and 74% according to the Federal Bureau of Statistics) came into being not just because of the well-known demographic explosion among the Albanians, but because of systematic expulsion of Serbs and other non-Albanians from the province. Also, the 1981 Census was conducted by the predominantly Albanian provincial government and should therefore be viewed with suspicion. Even the Yugoslav public is unaware that Albanian census-takers were instructed to classify Croats, Roma, Turks, Gorani, Moslems and other non-Albanians as “Albanians” on the census form. The fact that most of these groups became targets of Albanian terrorists and other separatists after the withdrawal of VJ and FRY security forces from Kosovo-Metohija and the arrival of KFOR (June 1999), joining the Serbs in refugee columns heading into inner Serbia (and in some cases Macedonia) confirms the suspicions about this Census. The concerns of Kosovo Albanians “about economic underdevelopment” that the Indictment quotes as a legitimate reason for Albanian revolt were borrowed from the propaganda quiver of the Albanian separatist movement. This movement cites that very reason to justify its separatist nature for a full 50 years. The Yugoslav public remembers that the Albanian riots in March and April 1981 began ostensibly over “bad food” in Pristina University’s cafeteria. Underdevelopment was debunked by the then-absolute leader of Kosovo Albanians, the member of the SFRY Presidium, Fadil Hoxha, in his address to the rioting demonstrators. On that occasion, among other things, he said: “The Albanian people of Kosovo has, together with the Serbs and other nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, achieved development it never before had in its history. Since this soil knows of Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins and others, Kosovo and its ethnic communities have never before had a faster and more dynamic growth. Not only that, but I can tell you that I know no other people who achieved this much progress in such a short time as the Albanians have in Kosovo. In only four decades, we have overcome the burden of feudalism and unprecedented cultural backwardness. Today, we Albanians have every opportunity to develop and nurture all the values that make up our national identity, like all the other peoples in Yugoslavia.” It is interesting that violent Albanian separatism appeared precisely at the time when this ethnic minority had the greatest rights and the widest possible autonomy within Yugoslavia, when the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija were granted constituent status in the Federation and all the rights of Republics within Yugoslavia. During 1968, there was an ongoing debate in Yugoslavia about amending the 1963 Constitution. The goal was to decentralize the powers of the Federal government and give more power to the Republics and autonomous provinces. It was in 1968 that Amendment VII made the autonomous provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija – into “constituent elements of the Federation.” Not even these rights were enough for the Albanian separatists, however. They demanded the province be granted the status of a separate Republic. That was the occasion for demonstrations and riots that began in Pristine on November 27, 1968. A new separatist rebellion in Kosovo-Metohija (the third since World War Two) began in the spring of 1981. Again this had the purpose of fracturing Yugoslavia. It is interesting that the intensity of separatist force in the province grew parallel to the growth of overall prosperity in Kosovo. To prove this claim, we will cite just some statistics: between 1954 and 1980, industrial production increased 18-fold; agriculture tripled; the entire province got electricity and a complete network of elementary, secondary and higher education institutions, encompassing all school-age children; modern roads, health care, social welfare and cultural facilities were constructed for the benefit of all inhabitants. Since World War Two, Kosovo-Metohija rose from last in Yugoslavia to third in the education levels of its workforce. In early 1980, the total number of pupils and students in this province was 500,000, which meant that every third inhabitant was attending an educational institution (see Sebrian Bureau of Stattistic figures, published 1986 in Belgrade). Rapid development of the province was spurred by a special fund within the Federal budget, established from taxes all over Yugoslavia. This fund financed 70% of all investments in Kosovo-Metohija between 1971 and 1985. Some 70% of the Fund was covered by taxes from Serbia. Between 1978 and 1985, the Fund also granted investment credits to Kosovo–Metohija – collected through taxes to the extent of 1.83% of the national GDP – at rates up to 25% more favorable than other undeveloped areas. Therefore, the claim by Fadil Hoxha that the Albanian people have never before seen such gigantic progress was based on accurate indicators and statistics. Paragraph 6 of the Indictment says: “In April 1987, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, who had been elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986, travelled to Kosovo. In meetings with local Serb leaders and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan MILOSEVIC endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. Thereafter, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exploited a growing wave of Serbian nationalism in order to strengthen centralised rule in the SFRY.” COMMENT: The claim that Slobodan Milosevic, exploiting a “growing wave of Serbian nationalism, went to Kosovo-Metohija in April 1987 and there “endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda" contradicts paragraph 5 of the Indictment, which talks about the Serbian "concern about discrimination against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government.” So, which nationalism was dominant in Kosovo-Metohija in the 1980s, Serbian or Albanian? Failure to crush the Albanian national-separatist movement that instigated the March-April 1981 riots resulted in the latter part of that decade in a veritable eruption of pent-up discontent among the Serbs in the province. Their demonstrations were sparked by arrests of several prominent Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija. Having failed to reach a negotiated solution with the provincial authorities, the demonstrators (some 500 of them) arrived in Belgrade on April 7, 1986. All they demanded from the Federal authorities at the meeting in Sava Center in Belgrade was peace, liberty and freedom of movement. They complained that even their children were not safe any more. “We are not free. All we ask for is liberty,” was their basic demand. As the elected chairman of the Presidium of the Serbian League of Communists’ (SK) Central Committee, Slobodan Milosevic automatically became a member of the inner circle of the Yugoslav League of Communists (SKJ), according to the SJK Statute. In that capacity, he could not exercise influence to “strengthen centralised rule in the SFRY,” even if he wanted to. Paragraph 7 of the Indictment says: “In September 1987 Slobodan MILOSEVIC and his supporters gained control of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. In 1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was re-elected as Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. From that influential position, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to further develop his political power.” COMMENT: Slobodan Milosevic and “his supporters” did not “gain control” over anything. They were elected to the leadership positions of their party, during its Congress, according to rules and procedures, in a secret vote. What happens in any political party, including the Serbian SK, cannot under any criteria be a basis of any Indictment, not even that of the ICTY. Therefore, we believe this paragraph does not deserve a serious response. Paragraph 8 of the Indictment says: “From July 1988 to March 1989, a series of demonstrations and rallies supportive of Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s policies—the so-called “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution”—took place in Vojvodina and Montenegro. These protests led to the ouster of the respective provincial and republican governments; the new governments were then supportive of, and indebted to, Slobodan MILOSEVIC.” COMMENT: Had the authors of the Indictment been concerned with its accuracy, this paragraph would have been left out. First of all, there was no so-called ‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution,’ but a real mass movement of the people in favor of the previously heralded, then sabotaged, reforms of contemporary Yugoslav society. The character of this movement is best summed-up in a phrase “The people happened!” which was widely used to describe it at the time. Reforms were resisted by the governments in both the republics and the provinces which were by then already under firm bureaucratic control and firmly allied with national-separatist movements in their communities. The nature of these governments is best reflected in their attitudes towards the preservation of SFRY in the late 1980s and early 1990s. If only the anti-bureaucratic revolution had swept from power the governments in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and even the federal government, as it had in Montenegro and Vojvodina. Had this been the case, Yugoslavia would have survived as a union, spared from all its subsequent misfortunes and tragedies. It would have implemented the planned reforms and continued its prosperous development. In that regard, the objective assessment of the anti-bureaucratic revolution is favorable, rather than incriminating, to Milosevic and “his supporters.” The entire process in Vojvodina and Montenegro “from July 1988 to March 1989” was entirely an internal matter of Yugoslavia. Therefore, both this paragraph and paragraph 8 of the Indictment cannot represent a crime over which the ICTY would have jurisdiction. Paragraph 9 of the Indictment says: “Simultaneously, within Serbia, calls for bringing Kosovo under stronger Serbian rule intensified and numerous demonstrations addressing this issue were held. On 17 November 1988, high-ranking Kosovo Albanian political figures were dismissed from their positions within the provincial leadership and were replaced by appointees loyal to Slobodan MILOSEVIC. In early 1989, the Serbian Assembly proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia which would strip Kosovo of most of its autonomous powers, including control of the police, educational and economic policy, and choice of official language, as well as its veto powers over further changes to the Constitution of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians demonstrated in large numbers against the proposed changes. Beginning in February 1989, a strike by Kosovo Albanian miners further increased tensions.” COMMENT: Our refutation of Paragraph 3 already answered the question of why and how the changes to the Serbian constitution were made in March 1989. Demands of the Serbian public to amend the Constitution were aimed at Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija equally. Because of their obstructionist policies, both provincial governments were dismissed. The Vojvodina government resigned in October 1988, followed by that of Kosovo-Metohija in November. Montenegro's government did the same in January 1989, under popular pressure. New governments were not appointed, as the Indictment alleges, but elected by popular vote. It is an established fact that all countries, and especially federations, regard national security, economic issues, and education as key factors of state unity. Therefore, it is entirely logical that jurisdiction over these matters was transferred from the provincial level to the Republic. For example, when the Albanian separatists organized a violent and widespread armed rebellion in Pristina and the rest of Kosovo-Metohija, Serbian police and even the Special Forces of the Federal Interior Ministry were unable to intervene against the rebellion until the federal Presidium issued that order after an emergency session. Allegations in the Indictment that the constitutional changes in Serbia denied Albanians their choice of language are false. The ethnic Albanian minority continued to have full rights to education in their native language, as well as the use of that language in communicating with all branches of government in the province. Speaking of Paragraph 9, however, we must wonder why and on what grounds does this Indictment address the issues of changes in system and personnel in a legitimate, sovereign state – undertaken, by the way, in full accordance with the Constitution and laws of that state? Also, in addressing these issues, why does the Indictment single out Kosovo-Metohija? At the same time, reforms took place in the province of Vojvodina and the republic of Montenegro. Paragraph 10 of the Indictment says: “Due to the political unrest, on 3 March 1989, the SFRY Presidency declared that the situation in the province had deteriorated and had become a threat to the constitution, integrity, and sovereignty of the country. The government then imposed “special measures” which assigned responsibility for public security to the federal government instead of the government of Serbia.” COMMENT: It is true that the Yugoslav Presidium, chaired at the time by Lazar Mojsov, declared a state of emergency (“special measures”) in one part of Yugoslav territory - the Autonomous Province of Kosovo – though on March 1, not March 3, as alleged. This decision was issued on the authority of the National Defense Law (SFRY Official Gazette, Issue 21/8). The NDL stipulates, among other things, that a state of emergency may be imposed in case of imminent danger to the country. Under the Constitution, only the SFRY Presidium was authorized to issue such a decision. Therefore, this legitimate and entirely constitutional decision can in no way be attributed to the any of the five indicted leaders of Serbia, including Slobodan Milosevic. Paragraph 11 of the Indictment says: “On 23 March 1989, the Assembly of Kosovo met in Pristina and, with the majority of Kosovo Albanian delegates abstaining, voted to accept the proposed amendments to the constitution. Although lacking the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the President of the Assembly nonetheless declared that the amendments had passed. On 28 March 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974 constitution.” COMMENT: We already refuted the allegations in Paragraph 11 in our refutation of Paragraph 3. We would only add that the provincial Parliaments, under the existing Serbian constitution, were not supposed to ratify the proposed amendments, only to vote on them. It was the Serbian Parliament that had the power to adopt the amendments. As we said already, under these amendments the provinces remained constituent elements of the federation, and their autonomy was not “effectively” revoked, as the Indictment alleges. Paragraph 12 of the Indictment says: “At the same time these changes were occurring in Kosovo, Slobodan MILOSEVIC further increased his political power when he became the President of Serbia. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and his post was formally confirmed on 6 December 1989.” COMMENT: Slobodan Milosevic became chairman of the Serbian Presidium on May 8, 1989 in an entirely legal manner, as regulated by the Constitution. Naturally, assumption of the highest governmental position in any state in and of itself means the assumption of the political authority that position entails. That fact is not by itself incriminating. It is puzzling that the ICTY Indictment dwells at all on who came into power and how in a sovereign state such as Serbia, then part of the sovereign and internationally recognized Yugoslav federation! Paragraph 13 of the Indictment says: “In early 1990, Kosovo Albanians held mass demonstrations calling for an end to the “special measures.” In April 1990, the SFRY Presidency lifted the “special measures” and removed most of the federal police forces as Serbia took over responsibility for police enforcement in Kosovo.” COMMENT: As it is untrue that "mass demonstrations” of “Kosovo Albanians,” – whether in the 1960s, 1970 or the 1980s (which were addressed in our refutation of Paragraph 5), no matter – were caused by economic backwardness or repression by Serbian police or military forces, it is also untrue that the 1990s demonstrations had as their goal to lift the state of emergency (“special measures”). This was only the official excuse, for public consumption. The real reason was always the same: a demand for secession from Yugoslavia and the creation of a “Greater Albania.” How repressive the “special measures” were is best seen by the ease with which the Albanian separatists could organize and launch “mass demonstrations.” Behind these, and all earlier “mass demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians,” was a well-organized separatist movement. Its illegal branches (such as PASRJ, the “Movement for the Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia” and others) had infiltrated not only the entire province, but also the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Illustrating this is the fact that between 1981 and 1988, some 241 illegal cells of Albanian separatists were discovered within the JNA, with some 1,600 members among the enlisted men and officers. One of them was Pvt. Aziz Kelmendi; on September 2, 1987, Kelmendi killed four of his comrades and wounded another six, as they slept in their barracks in Paracin. This example illustrates the criminal and terrorist nature of this movement and its illegal organizations. Paragraph 14 of the Indictment says: “In July 1990, the Assembly of Serbia passed a decision to suspend the Assembly of Kosovo shortly after 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates from that Assembly had passed an unofficial resolution declaring Kosovo an equal and independent entity within the SFRY. In September 1990, many of these same Kosovo Albanian delegates proclaimed a constitution for a “Republic of Kosovo.” One year later, in September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held an unofficial referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for independence. On 24 May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held unofficial elections for an assembly and president for the ‘Republic of Kosovo’.” COMMENT: It defies understanding that the ICTY, officially a legal extension of the U.N. Security Council, takes the side of the entirely illegal and unconstitutional Albanian separatist organizations, recognizing both this assembly and its “decisions.” There is no country in the world that would allow separatist forces to achieve their goals in this fashion. The authors of this Indictment are probably familiar with the U.S. government’s response to a relatively minor separatist group in Texas, which raised the issue of secession only to be mercilessly destroyed. (Yet U.S. diplomats urged the Albanian secessionists to hold such an “Assembly,” and since they could not do it inside the Provincial Parliament in Pristine, they urged them to hold it anyway, even if it had to be inside a bus.) Paragraph 15 of the Indictment says: “On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia joined to form the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected its President. As the successor to the League of Communists, the SPS became the dominant political party in Serbia and Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as President of the SPS, was able to wield considerable power and influence over many branches of the government as well as the private sector. Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC have both held prominent positions within the SPS. Nikola SAINOVIC was a member of the Main Committee and the Executive Council as well as a vice-chairman; and Milan MILUTINOVIC successfully ran for President of Serbia in 1997 as the SPS candidate.” COMMENT: This paragraph is not incriminating, therefore not meriting a comment. However, one note is necessary. The newly formed SPS was not the “successor to the League of Communists", as the Indictment alleges, not by its Statute, its memberships or property. It is true that some of the members of the old SK joined the newly formed SPS, but it is also true that some of them continued their membership in the League of Communists-the Yugoslav Movement (SK-PJ), while others joined other political parties that appeared on the Serbian political scene at the time. Other Leagues of Communists in republics of the former SFRY joined up with other leftist parties after stepping down from power, yet none of them was ever labeled “successor to the League of Communists.” After the abortive 14th Congress of the Yugoslav SK, many of its members joined other political parties, and not only in Serbia. Paragraph 16 of the Indictment says: “After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia on 28 September 1990, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of Serbia in multi-party elections held on 9 and 26 December 1990; he was re-elected on 20 December 1992. In December 1991, Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia”. COMMENT: Since it is true, this Paragraph does not require a response. It might not be extraneous to add that Slobodan Milosevic won these multi-party elections in a landslide. Paragraph 17 of the Indictment says: “After Kosovo’s autonomy was effectively revoked in 1989, the political situation in Kosovo became more and more divisive. Throughout late 1990 and 1991 thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police and civil servants were dismissed from their positions. The local court in Kosovo was abolished and many judges removed. Police violence against Kosovo Albanians increased.” COMMENT: As already mentioned, the autonomy of Kosovo was not revoked when this province was reintegrated into the Serbian constitutional system. After the attempts by Albanian separatists to organize the so-called assembly, issue the so-called “unofficial resolution” and hold the “unofficial” but also illegal and illegitimate referendum, and their proclamation of the “Republic of Kosovo,” the separatists launched a general boycott of the Serbian State in the entire territory of Kosovo-Metohija. One of the forms of boycott was the mass resignation of “doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police and civil servants” – all Kosovo Albanians. This was not because their employment was terminated, but because the secessionist leadership called for their boycott of the Serbian state, since only with the aid of these professionals could it establish the so-called parallel state (as Paragraph 18 describes below). The greatest victims of this lunacy were surely the generations of Albanian children, “educated” over the past decade in improvised schools without really gaining any knowledge. During this time, the children were exposed to intense nationalist and chauvinist indoctrination, which aided their recruitment into terrorist organizations (such as the “Kosovo Liberation Army” and others). A great percentage of these children were only instructed in criminal terrorism and hatred for all things non-Albanian. Therefore, this paragraph is incriminating only for the Albanian separatist leadership, and not the state of Serbia and its leaders. Paragraph 18 of the Indictment says: “During this period, the unofficial Kosovo Albanian leadership pursued a policy of non-violent civil resistance and began establishing a system of unofficial, parallel institutions in the health care and education sectors.” COMMENT: Everything mentioned in response to Paragraph 17 is applicable to this paragraph as well. We would add, however, that the Albanian separatist movement’s boycott of the Serbian state was nearly absolute when it came to civic obligations such as taxes and paying state-owned utility services (heating bills, power, water, vehicle license and registration, insurance, etc.). Yet the boycott was not practiced when there was a need to use the expert services and facilities of the national health system (maternity care, treatment of serious diseases, complicated surgical procedures, etc.). That is why we would like to ask the authors of this Indictment if any country in the world would tolerate such behavior from its citizens? This boycott lasted for almost a decade, bolstered by former Yugoslavia’s dismemberment and the subsequent civil and ethno-religious wars, during which the so-called international community systematically demonized Serbia and FRY. Any efforts of the Serbian government to end this inexcusable state of affairs were immediately deemed “repression” against the Albanian population. We will address in detail the notion of Albanian separatists’ “non-violent civil resistance” in Kosovo-Metohija in responding to Paragraph 23 of the Indictment. Only the uninformed and ill-intentioned could classify the attempts of Albanian secessionists in the early 1990s to create a “parallel state” through a general boycott of the Serbian government in Kosovo-Metohija as pursuit of “a policy of non-violent civil resistance.” Such a policy was really a well-planned, long-term strategy, whose scope and implications eluded at the time even the Serbian and Yugoslav political leadership. Only in the late 1990s, when the Albanian separatist leadership in Kosovo-Metohija decided to initiate widespread terrorist violence – in conjunction with their foreign sponsors and allies, of course – did it become apparent how important the period of so-called non-violent resistance was to the preparation of terrorist actions. For example, the unhindered mass indoctrination of classes of young Albanians with national-chauvinist ideas was possible only under a complete boycott of the Serbian government and its educational system. Some ten of thousands of fanatical youths in the so-called “parallel” schools were to be the recruiting pool for the “KLA” in the late 1990s. The same goes for the fortification of areas controlled by “parallel institutions” – i.e. the “KLA”. Anyone with the slightest awareness of the proportion and degree of fortification on some 50% of Kosovo-Metohija’s territory – over 5000 square kilometers – has no doubt that the “non-violent resistance” and “parallel institutions” were necessary to complete preparations for the violent secession that was eventually launched. Paragraph 19 of the Indictment says: “In late June 1991 the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter Slovenia), the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter Croatia), and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia and Herzegovina). On 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of war; a peace agreement was reached on 8 July 1991. Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, leading to fighting between Croatian military forces on the one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), paramilitary units and the ‘Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina’ on the other.” COMMNET: First of all, the SFRY did not “disintegrate.” It was violently fragmented through internal secessionist rebellions, organized and aided from foreign centers of power, primarily the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The only thing the Indictment gets right, perhaps inadvertently, is that the declarations of independence by former Yugoslav republics led to armed conflict. Decisions of Slovenian and Croatian separatists (on June 25, 1991) were illegal under the SFRY Constitution. A day after declaring independence, Slovenia took control of international borders with Italy, Austria and part of the border with Hungary. When federal authorities (Customs Service and police), accompanied by 2000 JNA troops, went to reclaim the usurped border crossings, they were ambushed by Slovenian police and paramilitaries and suffered casualties in men and vehicles. That is how the Slovenian armed rebellion began. As in the case of Albanian separatism, this unconstitutional and illegal behavior merits an indictment of the leaders that pursued it (Milan Kucan, Franjo Tudjman and their associates), not Slobodan Milosevic and his associates. This, however, was never done. Everything else in this Paragraph is false. There was no “fighting between Croatian military forces on the one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), paramilitary units and the ‘Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina’ on the other,” formed from territorial defense units while SFRY still existed. Until the “premature” recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states (January 15, 1992), no armed formation except the JNA can be considered a regular force, nor can their actions be considered fighting between military forces as recognized by international laws of war. Even less appropriate is the Indictment’s mention of “peace agreements” between parties in conflict. What this refers to is the Brioni Declaration of July 7, 1991, in which representatives of all the republics and the federal government, with European Community mediation, agreed to a three-month moratorium on unilateral separatist acts by Slovenia and Croatia, with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. This abuse of the term “peace agreement” is highly inappropriate for the ICTY, which at least presents itself publicly as a legal institution of international repute. Paragraph 20 of the Indictment says: “On 6 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence, resulting in wide scale war after 6 April 1992. On 27 April 1992, the SFRY was reconstituted as the FRY. At this time, the JNA was re-formed as the Armed Forces of the FRY (hereinafter VJ). In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA, and later the VJ, fought along with the ‘Army of Republika Srpska’ against military forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ‘Croat Defence Council.’ Active hostilities ceased with the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995.” COMMENT: Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on April 6, not March 6 as the Indictment alleges. It is also untrue that the well-known “premature” recognition of B-H “resulted in a wide-scale war” following the recognition. Armed incidents in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina began as early as March 1, 1992, threatening to grow into a wider-scale ethno-religious and civil war. (Some examples were the murder of Nikola Gardovic, a Serb and the groom’s father, during a wedding in the Sarajevo district of Bascarsija; the murder of a Serb at the Sarajevo Vrbanja bridge; the attack of Croatian paramilitaries on Posavina region on March 27, and their massacre of Serbs in the village of Sijekovac, committed together with the Moslem paramilitaries; clashes between Moslem and Serbian militia on Vraca hill above Sarajevo on April 5, etc.) During March 1992, representatives of both the Serbian and the Moslem sides attempted to avoid armed conflict and reach a peaceful solution to the impasse. The Lisbon conference (March 19, 1992) and the so-called Cutillero Plan represented the pinnacle of those efforts. Representatives of all three Bosnian peoples accepted the plan for cantonization of this republic, signing the agreement. Its implementation was thwarted, however, by the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman, by persuading Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic to renege on his signature, promising him full U.S. support in creating a unitary, Moslem-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to public admissions of Ambassador Zimmerman (in his book Origins of a Catastrophe) and Lord Peter Carrington (Intervju, issue 3338, Belgrade, October 20, 1995), the “Lisbon plan… wasn’t that bad” and “it turned out… I was wrong” (Zimmerman), while Izetbegovic was “in some way pushed into declaring independence” (Carrington). Therefore, the so-called premature recognition of independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, forced by the U.S. government, as well as Ambassador Zimmerman’s sabotage of the Lisbon Agreement, were the main causes of “wider-scale war” in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Encouraged by support and promises, on April 14, 1992, Izetbegovic issued a classified order to his “green beret” militia and all armed Moslems to initiate attacks against all facilities, units and officers of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Artificial disputes about the order’s authenticity are dispelled by the events that followed. Moslem attacks against JNA units and Serb civilians escalated throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the Drina valley (Foca, Gorazde, Visegrad, Srebrenica, Zvornik, Bijeljina). This situation forced the JNA to act in self-defense. At the end of April 1992, the so-called international community issued an ultimatum demanding the pullout of all JNA units from Bosnia-Herzegovina within 20 days. This was an unreasonably and carelessly short deadline, for withdrawing an Army from its former territory. (We have in mind that the Soviet Army was scheduled to withdraw from the former East Germany within three years.) Even with this tight deadline, as the JNA withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina, its peaceful pullout was hindered by numerous ambushes. The most drastic examples are events in Tuzla and Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo, the latter taking place in the presence of Izetbegovic and Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie [UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo]. This ambush resulted in the deaths of several enlisted men and officers, as well as one civilian. A JNA column peacefully retreating from Tuzla was attacked on May 15, 1992. Over 200 JNA troops were massacred (no one in Bosnia bothered to establish the exact number). These ambushes and massacres were remembered not only by their multiple innocent victims and the ruthless cruelty of Izetbegovic’s paramilitaries, but also because no one was ever called to face justice for them. What has the ICTY ever done about this? Also false is the Indictment's assertion that the JNA fought in this territory after May 19, 1992 – i.e. after its pulliut from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is true that after the JNA pullout, many of its members, Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, voluntarily stayed in their homeland and joined the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), defending their people. Paragraph 21 of the Indictment says: “Although Slobodan MILOSEVIC was the President of Serbia during the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was nonetheless the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de facto control of the federal government as well as the republican government and was the person with whom the international community negotiated a variety of peace plans and agreements related to these wars.” COMMENT: This paragraph, like many others, was formulated to be in maximum agreement with the “expert” study of Professor Andrew James Gow, commissioned by the ICTY with the goal of placing blame for Yugoslavia’s dismemberment on Serbia and its leadership (i.e. Slobodan Milosevic and his closest associates), rather than domestic separatists and their international sponsors. The fact is that Serbia was only one of the six entirely equal republics in SFRY at the time (1991), so Slobodan Milosevic, even had he wanted to, could not exercise “de facto control of the federal government” as Paragraph 21 alleges. More so because Croats held the key positions in the federal government during 1990 and until the very end of 1991: Ante Markovic chaired the Federal Executive Council (SIV, the federal cabinet) while Budimir Loncar was the Foreign Minister, for example. Clashes between the secessionists in Slovenia and Croatia and the JNA were over by November 1991, when Ante Markovic still ran the federal government with support from the United States. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has even less to do with the federal government and any influence Slobodan Milosevic could have had on it. Contrary to what Paragraph 21 alleges, when war started in that former Yugoslav republic, the SFRY had already been dismembered, and its “federal government” was no more. To compare the similarities between phrasing in Paragraph 21 and Paragraph 55 of Mr. Gow’s “expert” study, we quote the latter in full: “In 1990, several ideas regarding the future of Yugoslavia appeared. One of them, proposed by the then-chairman of the federal Presidium Borisav Jovic, ally of the Serbian President Milosevic, had the support of Serbia and the JNA. President Jovic’s proposal contained many of characteristics of the existing federation, and would strengthen the role of federal government, and Belgrade with it.” [translated back from Serbian] Yet this is how events in the SFRY unfolded in 1990: Organized efforts to find better and more acceptable solutions to the future of Yugoslavia were intensified. In that regard, the SFRY Presidium held exhaustive talks in mid-1990 (June 21 - July 23) with representatives of all republics and autonomous provinces, pointing to the growing concern and fear of citizens for the future of the country and its internal organization. It was emphasized that further aggravation of inter-republic and inter-ethnic relations could lead to an uncontrollable and undemocratic unraveling, with tragic consequences beyond prediction. Fundamental questions of Yugoslavia’s character were put to discussion: should it be a united state or a union of states, a federation or a confederacy; the issue of internal borders; the right to self-determination, including secession; and the means to resolve these issues. It was concluded that solutions for the future organization of the country could be reached only through democratic procedure and cooperation between the federal, republic and provincial authorities. A Program of measures and activities was prepared, detailing the actions to be undertaken by the Presidium, the SFRY Parliament and all the republics. This was, then, a document adopted by the collective heads of government, not an individual. Instead of implementing the Program, however, some republics rapidly organized paramilitaries and prepared for armed rebellion against Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). The SFRY parliament received a detailed report about these activities on October 17, 1990. During late 1990 and in early 1991, representatives of the republics and the federal government held talks on the constitutional reorganization of the country. In early 1991, the SFRY Presidium issued an executive order that all irregular and paramilitary forces in the country had to be disbanded. Slovenia and Croatia, however, openly informed the Presidium they would not allow this order to be executed in their territories. In the expanded session of the Presidium on March 21, 1991, it was decided to organize meetings between presidents of all republics and provinces, to discuss the issues of SFRY’s future organization. Six such meetings were held before the unilateral and violent secession of Slovenia and Croatia, which destroyed all efforts to solve the Yugoslav crisis peacefully. This had a decisive impact on future evens in Yugoslavia - especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which ethnically represented a smaller version of the federation. Everything cited above clearly indicates that while SFRY existed, Slobodan Milosevic was not “the person with whom the international community negotiated a variety of peace plans and agreements related to these wars.” Serbia’s representative in the SFRY Presidium, and a close associate of Slobodan Milosevic, was Dr. Borisav Jovic. In his last meeting with U.S. President George [H.W.] Bush, in October 1990, Jovic received U.S. promises that the United States gave its “full support to the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,” and that the accidental meeting between President Bush and Croatia’s leader Tudjman, a “handshake in the hallway,” did not change America’s principled position on Yugoslavia. Jovic communicated this to Milosevic. Therefore, we do not consider Milosevic’s agreement at the time with the “unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia” incriminating in any way. Paragraph 22 of the Indictment says: “Between 1991 and 1997 Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC both held a number of high ranking positions within the federal and republican governments and continued to work closely with Slobodan MILOSEVIC. During this period, Milan MILUTINOVIC worked in the Foreign Ministry of the FRY, and at one time was Ambassador to Greece; in 1995, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY, a position he held until 1997. Nikola SAINOVIC was Prime Minister of Serbia in 1993 and Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY in 1994.” COMMENT: This Paragraph in the Indictment is accurate, though there is nothing incriminating about the information it contains. Paragraph 23 of the Indictment says: “While the wars were being conducted in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo, while tense, did not erupt into the violence and intense fighting seen in the other countries. In the mid-1990s, however, a faction of the Kosovo Albanians organised a group known as Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or, known in English as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This group advocated a campaign of armed insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities. In mid-1996, the KLA began launching attacks primarily targeting FRY and Serbian police forces. Thereafter, and throughout 1997, FRY and Serbian police forces responded with forceful operations against suspected KLA bases and supporters in Kosovo.” COMMENT: Though for the reasons cited earlier the Albanian separatist movement was not yet ready to join the separatist movements in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in actively destroying the SFRY during 1990-1992, it did use the country’s deteriorating internal and international circumstances to expand preparations for its own armed rebellion – certainly with support from outside sponsors. Compared to the environment in which separatist rebellions were organized in other parts of Yugoslavia, the Albanian separatists had a far better environment for their rebellion as the decade went on. The first part of this decade was characterized by a fierce assault by New World Order forces, achieving results that would have been unimaginable to their ideologues even a few years earlier: 1) The USSR was broken up. One of the two superpowers, which helped anchor the bipolar world order, thus simply disappeared from the international scene; 2) Secondly, only one of the major military alliances disappeared in the USSR’s wake (the Warsaw Pact). 3) Germany united, and overnight asserted its dominant role in political reorganization, first inside the European Community and then outside its borders. 4) The SFRY was broken up, and its territory beset with several short and long ethno-religious and civil wars, in which the Serbian nation suffered the most – and with it Serbia and Kosovo-Metohija as well. Serbia was realistically unable to assert its full authority in Kosovo-Metohija, due to the necessity of aiding its compatriots across the Drina River and coping with the consequences of embargoes imposed by the so-called international community. Local government in Kosovo-Metohija was inefficient and corrupted by bribes from wealthy Albanians. Some opposition forces in Serbia sabotaged the state and acted as a fifth column, valuing the struggle for power over the struggle against Albanian separatism. The indictment says that “In the mid-1990s… a faction of the Kosovo Albanians organised a group known as… the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).” This is only partially true. The origins of Albanian separatists’ terrorist organizations in Kosovo-Metohija date much earlier than the “mid-1990s”. A forerunner of the “KLA” was formed on February 17, 1982, when Albanian émigrés in Germany (FRG) established the National Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (NPRK). Four illegal organizations from Kosovo-Metohija joined the NPRK: the Movement for the Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia (PASRJ), the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosovo (OMLK), the Communist-Leninist Party of Yugoslav Albanians (PKMLSHJ) and the People’s Red Front (FKB). Until the early 1990s, NPRK organized the activities of several smaller, fanatical terrorist cells, well trained in Albania, Switzerland and FR Germany. Numerous indicators of their activity were cited in responses to previous paragraphs of the Indictment. Albania has always had the key role in instigating and aiding Albanian terrorism in Kosovo-Metohija. After Albania emerged from seclusion (following Enver Hoxha’s death) in the latter 1980s, Turkey had a dominant influence on Albanian affairs, which included aiding the growing terrorist arm of Albanian separatists in Kosovo-Metohija. In the late 1980s, however, German intelligence (BND) displaced Turkey as the dominant foreign influence in Albania, while U.S. intelligence (CIA) has had a strong presence in Albania and Kosovo-Metohija since the early 1990s. The idea of closer military organization among the Albanian separatists dates back to the early 1990s and the declaration of a “Republic of Kosova” (at the July 2, 1992 “Kacanik assembly”), when it was decided to form illegal police and paramilitary groups. December 1994 was the first public encounter with the “KLA,” following the assassination of Lutvi Ajvazi, a police inspector from Srbica. On that occasion the “KLA command” issued a communiqué taking responsibility for this crime, also claiming several earlier assassinations of “occupiers and traitors.” Under the banner of “liberating” all territories in the Balkans inhabited by Albanians and uniting them in a single, Albanian state, the NPRK called its terrorist groups the “Army of Kosova.” Yugoslavia’s dismemberment (1990-1992) was used by the Albanian separatists to accelerate weapons acquisition and paramilitary training. In the spring of 1993, the Serbian Security Service (SDB) succeeded in dealing a partial and temporary setback to the Albanian separatist paramilitaries; some 14 members of the so-called “Republic of Kosova” ministry of defense were arrested, and many incriminating documents seized. What they showed was that the “ministry of defense” planned to organize an army of some 40,000 men for the armed rebellion, with the appropriate modern weaponry. According to the documents, a total of 18 brigades were envisioned, (3 in Pristina, 2 each in Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica, 2 each in Gnjilane, one each Urosevac, Kacanik, Decani, Klina and Drenica), numbering 2,000-5,000 men each. Every brigade had a specified zone of operations (ZO). Since the “KLA” had a very similar organizational structure and distribution of ZO when it attacked the Serbian security forces and the VJ in 1998-99, this testifies to the long-term character of plans for armed rebellion in Kosovo-Metohija. Facts decisively refute the Indictment’s allegation that the paramilitary formations of Albanian separatists were formed only in the “mid-1990s,” and definitely refute another suggestion: that the “KLA” was “a faction of the Kosovo Albanians,” isolated, almost autonomous, and a lone advocate of “armed insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities.” The “KLA,” much like paramilitary branches of other separatist movements (the Croatian National Guard Corps - ZNG, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Patriot League, ETA’s military arm in Basque, and others in Corsica, Ireland, Chechnya, etc.), is part and parcel of the Albanian separatist movement in Kosovo-Metohija, its “military arm” without whose terrorist activities that movement would have never been able to cause a crisis in the Balkans and southern Europe, threatening the peace in the entire region. Unlike the inadequate descriptions of aggressive and terrorist activities of Albanian separatists found throughout this Indictment, this Paragraph at least acknowledges that the so-called “KLA” in 1996 “began launching attacks primarily targeting FRY and Serbian police forces.” A question arises from this, essentially accurate, statement: which country or government in the world would fail to respond to such attacks with appropriate measures? Certainly, the response of VJ and Serbian police was far less “forceful” than U.S. police and military action against the Texas separatists in 1999. Even though all the rebels there were killed in “forceful actions” by the U.S. security forces, no one deemed this an instance of “excessive force”, and there was certainly no condemnation by the so-called international community. While not dwelling on the methods of fighting separatist terrorism in other countries (the UK in Northern Ireland, Spain in the Basque country, France in Corsica and Turkey in northern Kurdistan), we would like to point out the “forceful actions” of Macedonian armed forces against the Albanian “liberation army” in early 2001, using tanks and combat helicopters. Macedonia has not been declared an outlaw state. Yet the far less “forceful” operations by Serbian security and the VJ against that very same Albanian “liberation army” somehow merit the ICTY Indictment of Serbian and Yugoslav leadership as war criminals! What kind of “justice” is this, valid in one case but no other? Further attention is merited by the condensed description of events in Kosovo-Metohija in the early 1990s, when the Albanian separatist rebellion did not “erupt into the violence and intense fighting...” such as in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Years of total boycott of the Serbian state and the development of some sort of parallel society (the “Republic of Kosova”) had created a perception, reinforced by indoctrination, in many Kosovo-Metohija Albanians that secession from Serbia and the creation of a “Greater Albania” were in their grasp. This was a vacuum in which the Albanian separatists could grow, strengthen its organization and enlist more support virtually unhindered. Especially important was the separatists' ability to connect with international factors that expressed interest in their goals, thus securing various forms of aid. Since this was an aggressive, separatist movement, determined to achieve its goals and those of its foreign sponsors through genocidal terrorism, its priority was obviously to create the appropriate paramilitary groups and arm and equip them for terrorist actions. Therefore, the Indictment’s allegation that the Albanian separatist movement embraced “non-violent” resistance to Yugoslav and Serb authorities until the “KLA” appeared in the mid-1990s, is unsustainable. Rather to the contrary, this movement spent the first half of the 1990s preparing for armed rebellion, using the cover of wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina. Paragraph 24 of the Indictment says: “After concluding his term as President of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY 15 July 1997, and assumed office on 23 July 1997. Thereafter, elections for the office of the President of Serbia were held; Milan MILUTINOVIC ran as the SPS candidate and was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997. In 1996, 1997 and 1998, Nikola SAINOVIC was re-appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY. In part through his close alliance with Milan MILUTINOVIC, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to retain his influence over the Government of Serbia”. COMMENT: Our response to this Paragraph is similar to what we said about Paragraph 22 above. Paragraph 25 of the Indictment says: “Beginning in late February 1998, the conflict intensified between the KLA on the one hand and the VJ, the police forces of the FRY, police forces of Serbia, and paramilitary units (all hereinafter forces of the FRY and Serbia), on the other hand. A number of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were killed and wounded during this time. Forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a campaign of shelling predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns and villages, widespread destruction of property, and expulsions of the civilian population from areas in which the KLA was active. Many residents fled the territory as a result of the fighting and destruction or were forced to move to other areas within Kosovo. The United Nations estimates that by mid-October 1998, over 298,000 persons, roughly fifteen percent of the population, had been internally displaced within Kosovo or had left the province.” COMMENT: The very first sentence demonstrates the bias of the ICTY prosecutors when qualifying the combatants in Kosovo-Metohija. First the “KLA” is referred to without any qualifiers, as if this was a regular armed force or a liberation movement of an internationally recognized state, rather than a separatist and terrorist paramilitary movement, beyond a doubt the most criminal of all that operated in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Yugoslav Army, Serbian police and militias were lumped together (“forces of the FRY and Serbia”) which is both amateurish and not supported by facts. Secondly, the “conflict” between the “KLA” and Serbian security forces did not “intensify” on its own, nor was this intensification bilateral. Under direct influence of the U.S. and German governments, the Albanian secessionists decided to commence an open armed rebellion in Kosovo-Metohija. This decision was preceded by several exploratory trips, round tables and “scientific” gatherings (in Vienna, April 18-19, 1997, in Ulcinj on June 29, between Adem Demaqi and Momcilo Trajkovic in New York, etc.), with the help and participation of the official and semi-official representatives of many Western countries. The goal of these gatherings was to “soften” the Serbian State authorities to “voluntarily” accept the so-called international mediation of the Kosovo problem. Naturally, the “hard-line” position of the FRY and Serbian authorities regarding the demands for so-called international mediation was motivated by experiences with the so-called international community since Slovenia’s secession. Direct involvement of the United States in preparing the Albanian separatists’ armed rebellion in Kosovo-Metohija was demonstrated (among other things) by the appointments of Ambassadors Holbrooke and Gelbard as special envoys for the southern Serbian province, and their direct contact with “KLA” headquarters. Encouraged by this U.S. behavior, Klaus Kinkel, German foreign minister at the time, called “all European countries to follow the American example and make contact with the KLA.” That was when the Albanian separatist leaders and their foreign sponsors estimated that their numbers, organization, armament, substantial separatist indoctrination and both the internal and external weakness of the Serbian state and FRY, offered them a chance to conquer the area of Kosovo-Metohija and force Serbia and FRY to accept the solutions imposed by foreign diktat. So they attacked, fiercely, often without making any distinction between civilians and uniformed officials, between ordinary citizens and police, police and the military, or even Albanians and Serbs. According to statistics of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP), between February and June 1998 there were 409 registered terrorist attacks in Kosovo-Metohija – over 80 attacks per month, an average of about three per day. This is also documented in the operational logs of the Pristina Corps HQ. It is worth pointing out that of those terrorist attacks, 261 of them targeted civilians and civilian buildings. In this period, terrorists killed 35 and injured 50 non-Albanians (29 seriously); 143 of their victims were non-Serbs (among them 26 killed and 43 injured Albanians). Serbian police forces were targets of 148 terrorist attacks, suffering 18 dead and 67 injured. An eye-opener is that the “KLA” terrorists killed more Albanians (26) than Serbian police (18), with a similar proportion among the injured. Such ruthlessness to those among their own people, who were reluctant to fully support the most violent expression of Albanian separatism, is unprecedented. Traditionally, Albanians did not kill other Albanians, since that would precipitate an almost endless blood feud. The so-called “KLA” violated even this traditional code. Whether it did so by itself, or under foreign influence, has never been established. All the available battle reports of the VJ Pristina Corps from January to early April 1998 (classified orders number 122-3, 311-2, 78-8, 78-12, 78-18, 78-29 and 1/138-1) testify and prove that the Corps units took the following actions: “measures taken to improve security of the border,” transition to “increased security of the interstate border with Albania” in order to prevent the increasing number of illegal crossings from that country, “field deployment of certain units,” accompanied by “preparation and deployment of field base camps,” etc. The field camps did not conduct combat operations, but “combat training of units and personnel of all services” for the sake of “improving preparedness of Task Forces.” Since the deployment was undertaken in areas where Albanian separatists’ terrorist groups were operating, the organizational orders of April 11, 1998 emphasize (in section 7) that measures should be taken to avoid “damage to the civilian population (such as disturbing pastures and fields)”, in order to thwart the terrorist goal of provoking hostility among the people towards the VJ. Orders also demanded “appropriate behavior of all troops towards the local population in areas of training exercises,” avoiding all provocations and possible “conflicts with the local population.” Since there was a realistic expectation that “terrorist groups might launch surprise actions,” the orders mandated “security measures to protect personnel, equipment and data.” In early March 1998, due to a “deteriorating security situation in the Corps’ area of responsibility,” the Pristina Corps Headquarters ordered (classified order # 72-2 of March 1) that: “…in order to prevent armed conflict from escalating” the Corps would “reinforce security of the border towards Albania” using peacetime formations trained for that purpose. Later, in the second half of March 1998, given the complex security situation in Kosovo-Metohija, the escalation of terrorist attacks and illegal crossings from Albania, and the impending threat to communications with isolated military posts and border outposts, the Corps’ HQ ordered the deployment of forces to secure a wider strip along the border, according to the “order establishing special measures of permanent security alert,” so that certain Task Forces deployed along certain communication routes and camp sites along the border (classified order # 1/138-1, April 10, and #1/138 of April 11, 1998). Obviously, all through mid-April 1998 the Yugoslav Army’s Pristina Corps fostered friendly relations with civilians, even seeking to avoid damages to “pastures and fields.” The “shelling of majority Albanian towns and villages in Kosovo” alleged throughout the Indictment, as well as alleged expulsions of civilians from the “KLA’s” areas of operation, is obviously nowhere near the truth. Moreover, Serbian police units could not have “shelled” anything; even though it had several heavy skirmishes with the terrorists (one of them is described in more detail below), it had no artillery. All other orders of the Pristina Corps, Third Army and the VJ General Staff contain specific instructions for civilian relations, with the emphasis on the protection of person and property. Soon after the orders cited above (April 11), the Pristina Corps CO issued another order, (classified #880-35 of May 16, 1998, instructing (section 4): “Brigade and Task Force commanders will make contact with local Albanians and warn them that the VJ was not deployed against them, but for the purpose of regular combat training and suppression of terrorists. Warn the Albanian population not to attack the VJ, because the Army will respond to any attack with all available means.” Sections 8, 9 and 11 of the same Order instruct: - “Without explicit orders from the Pristina Corps HQ, all Pristina Corps units and Task Forces in the field shall not undertake any actions that would needlessly involve them in combat. There shall be no expulsions or attacks on civilians.” - “Without explicit orders from the Pristina Corps HQ , all Pristina Corps units and Task Forces in the field shall under no circumstances enter residential areas to conduct searches, sweeps, arrests of individuals and similar activities.” - “In case of terrorist attacks on Pristina Corps units, and before responding to the said attacks, warn the attackers to cease fire and retreat, while notifying the civilians to leave the zone.” Serbian police forces, naturally, had to respond to terrorist attack by returning fire, as well as taking offensive action to neutralize terrorist groups, destroy their strongholds and establish effective control over communication routes and territory. One of the first major engagements between the Serbian police and the so-called KLA was in securing the villages of Lausa, Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze, in March, 1998. A terrorist group led by Adem Jashari had attacked police patrols on February 28, killing four officers and injuring two. While the Serbian MUP forces dealt with this terrorist situation in the Drenica area, focusing on the villages of Prekaze and Jablanica and the road to Kalausa, the Pristina Corps HQ monitored their activities, documenting them in command reports of March 5 and March 6, 1998. In these reports, the Corps’ commanding officer indicated some problems created by the MUP forces’ actions, such as the use of combat vehicles that were not painted blue or clearly marked. This could have created the impression that VJ units were involved in the operation, which was not the case (classified order 78-18 of March 9, 1998). This report also noted that the terrorists were using civilians as human shields when confronting the police, a practice which caused a number of unnecessary, civilian casualties. Civilians who defied terrorist orders to remain in the combat zone were nevertheless organized in a refugee column, to create the impression of expulsion or exodus. This practice, which was part of the standard tactic employed by the “KLA", will be discussed separately. Terrorist attacks throughout Kosovo-Metohija did not spare the VJ, targeting its units, command facilities and outposts, especially along the border with Albania. A coded report from the Pristina Corps HQ to the Security Directorate of the VJ General Staff, dated April 28, 1998, cites the number of killed (19) and captured (2) terrorists, as well as the precise quantity and composition of weapons and equipment captured around the border outposts, “Morina”, “Gorozup”, “Kosare”, “Cestak” and “Orgusa”: 169 assault rifles, 67 rifles, 4 anti-tank guns, 7 machine guns, one RPG, 6 machine pistols, 164 RPG rounds, 18 boxes of ammunition, 27,163 bullets (7.62 mm), etc. Operational logs of the Pristina Corps HQ also show that on April 24, 1998, one group of “KLA” terrorists attacked a unit belonging to the 52nd Military Police Battalion from the position of Suka Vogelj, while on the same day the border outpost in the village of Babaloc came under fire. Responding to the terrorist attack, units of the 52nd Military Police Battalion attacked Suka Vogelj and killed seven terrorists. The following day, VJ border patrol units engaged a terrorist group attempting a crossing from Albania near the border outpost, “Kosare,” killing 16 terrorists and capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunition. In April 1998, Albanian terrorists launched 11 attacks altogether against VJ units and positions. Only three and a half months after these initial terrorist attacks on the VJ did the Army begin offensive, counter-terrorist operations. This ought to be enough to unequivocally answer the question of who initiated the use of force in Kosovo-Metohija. Attacks on VJ units apparently had the goal of forcing and accelerating its logical response, which was to be used by separatist and Western propaganda as evidence that a “mass Albanian uprising” was underway in Kosovo-Metohija, which “rightfully expected NATO aid.” Therefore, in the first half of 1998 (from the end of February to mid-July), the VJ did not take offensive actions against the “KLA,” nor did it have paramilitary formations under its com |