INDICTED continued part 4

http://emperors-clothes.com/book/book4.htm

 

Maksimovic’s report was completely different. However, none of the world leaders paid it any heed. She said that a massacre of civilians in Racak was out of the question. At first, she was not even allowed to survey the scene.

Following Walker’s scenario, the dead terrorists were not buried the same day (as Moslem custom calls for) but were dressed in civilian clothing and set on display in the nearby mosque, in order to send the images of “massacred civilians” to the world.

Still, because of the obvious discrepancies between reports on what happened in Racak, a “neutral” group of Finnish forensic experts was formed to conduct autopsies on the bodies and establish if they were civilians or “KLA” combat casualties. Though the Finnish experts’ report denies any massacre in Racak, Walker and his superiors managed to extort a statement from their leader, Dr. Helena Ranta (probably with a sizeable payoff), that the victims were “probably” civilians. A full report was classified – just like the one about Markale in Sarajevo – and stored in the vaults of Secretary Solana and General Clark. Those who ordered the criminal bombardment of Yugoslavia made the fabricated massacre in Racak into a pretext for their already planned aggression.

Only in early February 2001 did the Finnish experts’ report reach the ICTY. Its conclusions were printed in Forensic Science International, (quoted by the Berliner Zeitung of February 16, 2001), saying, among other things, that one cannot make a conclusion that security forces massacred Albanian civilians in Racak, as Walker had claimed.

If, at the time the Indictment was put together, its authors could possibly have believed Walker’s statements, they cannot continue to treat them as key evidence now that the entire fabrication has been exposed. Cannot, that is, if they care for their reputation and integrity. Also exposed was the criminal character of U.S.  Ambassador/General William Walker.

William Walker officially began his diplomatic career in Peru, in 1961. Between 1988 and 1992, he was the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador. He really belongs to the inner circle of CIA experts for covert operations, with the likes of Oliver North, Morton Ambramowitz and others, who use diplomatic passports only as cover and protection. In this role, his greatest success was in Panama, alongside the former NATO commander Gen. Wesley Clark,  and earlier in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the 1980s, when he fought their national liberation movements. Walker was even investigated – though unsuccessfully – over illegal armament and infiltration of the Contras into Nicaragua from their bases in El Salvador. At the time of Walker’s service in El Salvador, local “death squads” trained and armed in U.S. covert operation camps (under Walker’s supervision) committed numerous massacres.

In Kosovo-Metohija, Walker became “famous” for his extreme bias in favor of the Albanian separatist movement. He always had time to give speeches at the funerals of terrorist casualties, but he never had a moment to give his condolences to the families of murderer police officers, or abducted and murdered Kosovo Serbs, even when massacres of Serbs were found and clearly established (such as the crematorium in Klecka and the massacre site in Donji Ratis), including the murder of four youths at the café “Panda” in Pec.

If the ICTY really wanted to prosecute those responsible for “crimes against humanity and violations of laws and customs of war” it should first have indicted William Walker. Yugoslavia’s political leadership should answer to Yugoslav courts as to why such an obscure and unscrupulous character was allowed to become head of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo-Metohija, especially following the extremely negative experiences that the leaders of Republika Srpska Krajina had with Walker in Eastern Slavonia.

Paragraph 29 of the Indictment says: “In a further response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo, an international peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France beginning on 7 February 1999. Nikola SAINOVIC, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, was a member of the Serbian delegation at the peace talks and Milan MILUTINOVIC, President of Serbia, was also present during the negotiations. The Kosovo Albanians were represented by the KLA and a delegation of Kosovo Albanian political and civic leaders. Despite intensive negotiations over several weeks, the peace talks collapsed in mid-March 1999.

COMMENT: The so-called peace conference in Rambouillet was not a “response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo” but a continuation of the scenario to create an artificial pretext for NATO’s aggression against the FRY. If one follows elementary logic, then the “incident” in Racak cannot be taken as evidence of the “continuing conflict in Kosovo,” especially since it has been established that the victims of this “incident” were not innocent civilians, but armed terrorists of the “KLA”

Rambouillet was preceded by a meeting of the so-called Contact Group in London, (January 29, 1999), which had previously discussed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, though lacking any mandate to do so. Acting on behalf of the so-called international community, this soi-disant organization created the well-known list of ten principles for resolving the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija:

Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles/Basic Elements, 30 January 1999

General Elements

- Necessity of immediate end of violence and respect for a  cease-fire

- Peaceful solution through dialogue

- Interim agreement: a mechanism for a final settlement after an interim period of three years

- No unilateral change of interim status

- Territorial integrity of the FRY and neighbouring countries

- Protection of the rights of members of all national communities (preservation of identity, language and education; special protection for their religious institutions)

- Free and fair elections in Kosovo (municipal and Kosovo-wide) under supervision of the OSCE

- Neither party shall prosecute anyone for crimes related to the Kosovo conflict (exceptions: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law

- Amnesty and release of political prisoners

- International involvement and full co-operation by the parties concerning implementation

Governance in Kosovo

- People of Kosovo to be self-governed by democratically accountable Kosovo institutions

- High degree of self-governance realized through own legislative, executive and judiciary bodies (with authority over, intern alia, taxes, financing, police, economic development, judicial system, health care, education and culture (subject to the rights of the members of national communities), communications, roads and transport, protection of the environment

- Legislative: Assembly

- Executive: President of Kosovo, Government, Administrative bodies

- Judiciary: Kosovo court system

- Clear definition of competencies at communal level

- Members of all national communities to be fairly represented at all levels of administration and elected government

- Local police representative of ethnic make-up with coordination on Kosovo level

- Harmonisation of Serbian and Federal legal frameworks with Kosovo interim agreement

-  Kosovo consent required inter alia for changes to borders and declaration of martial law.

Even though these principles were formulated to be refused by Serbia and Yugoslavia, they were accepted at considerable surprise to their authors. The goal was to accept even the unfavorable points, in order to avoid the danger to the security of the nation posed by the oft-repeated threat of NATO aggression.

What happened was a reprise of events from August 1995 in Republika Srpska. At that time, the  United States had offered a 12-point peace initiative, expecting the Serbs to reject it and prepared to use that as a pretext for NATO intervention in favor of Moslem and Croat forces. When the Serbs did accept the unfavorable U.S.  platform, there was an explosion at the Sarajevo Markale market (August 28, 1995), killing 37 and injuring 45 civilians. Serbs were blamed right away, though all foreign and local experts claimed that the round could not have come from Serb positions. A day later, NATO began bombing the civilian and military targets in Republika Srpska.

By accepting the 10 Contact Group principles, Yugoslavia offered an Agreement on Kosovo-Metohija  self-government in full accordance with those principles. The Agreement contained all the elementary principles of self-government in the province: from the basics to democracy, the assembly, a council of ministers, the judiciary, human rights, local police, amnesty for all prisoners except those responsible for war crimes, etc.

An embryonic core of this agreement was based on the Milosevic-Rugova agreement from early 1996 (the “3+3” treaty), among other things dealing with educational issues and the establishment of local, all-Albanian police in Djakovica.

That agreement had been accompanied by a pledge to implement the “September 1, 1996 Education Agreement”, signed by three Serb (Ratomir Vico, Goran PerCevic and Dobrosav Bjeletic) and three Albanian  representatives (Fehmi Agani, Abdulj Rama and Rexhep Osmani), in the presence of three representatives of “Comunitŕ di Sant’Egidio,” whose status was not exactly clear. This agreement specified the deadlines for activating the Pristina University Balkans Studies Institute (March 31, 1997), reopening three colleges at the Pristina University, with “returning Albanian students and faculty” (April 30, 1998), and the use of university facilities by non-Albanian faculty and students. Along with these measures, the Agreement established deadlines for reopening other Pristina University schools (May 31, June 30, September 30, 1998 etc.), along with a similar process for reopening the elementary and secondary schools. The “3+3” Committee pledged to secure funding for construction of new classrooms.

In other words, practice has shown that agreement on peaceful coexistence between ethnic communities in Kosovo-Metohija was possible. That is why the Albanian delegation in Rambouillet showed interest in negotiating with the Yugoslav delegation about this document. However, the U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, interfered and prevented further discussions, following the recipe established when his colleague Warren Zimmerman scuttled the 1992 Lisbon agreement.

The Albanians had previously refused to sign the Contact Group principles, without even discussing them, let alone holding “intense negotiations” with the Yugoslav delegation. Therefore, the Rambouillet “peace conference,” (as the Indictment baselessly calls it) did not “collapse” because of some supposed uncooperative or uncompromising position of the Yugoslav delegation. Rather, the conference  never had a chance because the Albanians, in consultations with the U.S. government, did not even agree to hold direct talks with the Yugoslav delegation, let alone sign the Contact Group’s 10 principles. Certainly, they could anticipate the Americans’ next move. Having created a stalemate, the U.S. Secretary of State M. Albright stepped in with a set of entirely new, extremely unacceptable and humiliating demands – the well-known Rambouillet ultimatum. Representatives of Serbia Yugoslavia couldn’t possibly agree to them, because they were not authorized to sign an act of  capitulation.

This ultimatum (officially, the Annexes to the Contact Group principles) demanded: a President, Prime Minister and government for Kosovo, its own Parliament, Supreme Court and an entire judicial system; also that Kosovo would have the authority to pass legislation without approval or revision by Serbia or the FRY, regulating taxes, economic, scientific, social, regional and technological development, as well as foreign relations on the same level as Serbia. Another humiliating, insulting and utterly unacceptable ultimatum, akin to “deploy military forces... authorized to use necessary force in order to secure the implementation of the agreement.” The head of CIM (Civilian Implementation Mission) would be “authorized to issue directives binding for both sides regarding all important issues as he deems necessary, including appointing and dismissing officials and overriding institutions” According to paragraph 8 of the Annex that deals with deployment of occupation troops in Yugoslavia, NATO forces were supposed to have “unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters,” free use of “airports, roads, rails, and ports”, as well as the right to make “modifications to certain infrastructure “to suit its needs. According to this annex, NATO troops would have full immunity from legal process, “whether civil, administrative, or criminal.” This would have encompassed murder, rape, pillaging, drug-running and other crimes.

In a press statement signed by Hashim Taqi [or Thaci – ed.], the delegation of Albanian separatists unconditionally accepted the so-called Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo of 23 February 1999 – i.e. the Contact Group Principles with the Annexes inserted by M. Albright. Taqi’s statement said:

Recognizing with gratitude the contribution to that goal made by the Contact Group members, the co-chairmen, the negotiators and the hosts of the conference, international institutions involved in the process of negotiations and implementation, and especially the tireless efforts of the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright...the Kosovo delegation reiterates its agreement to the integral text as submitted and accepted on 23 February 1999. This is a definite text, which cannot be subject to further negotiations or changes, except purely technical ones.... As stated on 23 February 1999, Kosovo invites and expects quick deployment of NATO [troops], with complete and effective implementation of their foreseen functions, as well as others intended to implement the Interim Agreement, strictly in accordance with the modalities of command and control, and within the time frame set out in the Interim Agreement. Full implementation of this part of the Interim Agreement represents a key condition for the entire package, and for the agreement that Kosovo has given. Kosovo expects to be consulted regarding NATO’s precise plan of deployment...”

Such a humiliating ultimatum made even American newspapers (Washington Post, June 1999, Houston Chronicle on March 28 that year, and others) and many experts on international law ask if anyone could have expected the Serbs to accept such a thing. Would you have signed such an agreement?

So the Serbian and Yugoslav delegation cannot be blamed for the “collapse” of the Rambouillet negotiations, which never took place. The main responsibility for all that happened in Rambouillet, including the “collapse” of “peace negotiations,” lies with the United States policy represented by M. Albright.

Instead of honest negotiations with the purpose of peacefully resolving the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija, the U.S. – through M. Albright – had steered the Rambouillet and Paris meetings towards collapse from the very beginning, so it would have a justification to start aggression against the FRY. Such efforts are demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that Albright placed a call to Hashim Taqi in Tirana the day after NATO’s air and missile strikes began (25 March 1999), demanding that the “KLA” begin a general armed insurrection in Kosovo-Metohija.

The most pertinent assessment of U.S. foreign policy towards the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija was given by H. Kissinger (“New World Disorder,” Newsweek, May 31, 1999), saying, among other things:

“Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far-off days in February, when other options were still open. The first was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia, a country with which NATO was not at war, and administer a province that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's independence. The second was to use the foreseeable Serb refusal as justification for starting the bombing.”

Rambouillet was not a negotiation – as is often claimed – but an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an administration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the U.N. Charter and multilateral procedures.”

It is especially interesting that the Indictment refers to these non-negotiations as an international peace conference,” since such conferences had in the past only been held at the end of major wars, between the victors and the defeated. One of the “parties” in Rambouillet was the “KLA”, i.e. a terrorist paramilitary of the Albanian separatist movement. According to general principles of the international community, there can be no negotiations with terrorists. The United States was among the first to build this principle into its foreign policy. Instead of dealing with the paradox of having the terrorist “KLA’s” leader Hashim Taqi represented at an “international peace conference,” the Indictment cites for their presence the legitimate representatives of a sovereign and internationally recognized state - Milan Milutinovic and Nikola Sainovic!? Even this is inaccurate, since neither of them headed the Yugoslav/Serb delegation. Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Prof. Dr Ratko Markovic, did. Other members of the delegation were Prof. Dr Vladan Kutlesic, deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, Sokoll Cuse (Albanian Democratic Reform Party), Faik Jashari (Kosovo Democratic Initiative), Vojislav Zivkovic (Kosovo-Metohija Serbs and Montenegrins), Zajnelabedin Kurjes and Guljbehar Sabaovic (of the Turkish community); Ibro Vajt (of the Gorani[Slavic Muslim] community), Refik Senadovic (of the Moslem/Bosniak community), Ljuan Koka (of the Roma community),  and Cerim Abazi (of the Egyptian community).

Paragraph 30 of the Indictment says: “During the peace negotiations in France, the violence in Kosovo continued. In late February and early March, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo Albanian villages and towns. The FRY military forces were comprised of elements of the 3rd Army, specifically the 52nd Corps, also known as the Pristina Corps, and several brigades and regiments under the command of the Pristina Corps. The Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, with command responsibilities over the 3rd Army and ultimately over the Pristina Corps, is Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC. The Supreme Commander of the VJ is Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

COMMENT: The Indictment is too vague when it refers to “the violence in Kosovo continued” during the peace negotiations. Every act of violence is committed by someone. This was also the case in Kosovo-Metohija, at every stage in the crisis. Only the ICTY Indictment chooses not to identify them whenever these perpetrators are Albanian terrorists of the “KLA,” so as not to identify the “KLA” as the main perpetrator of violence at the time of the so-called peace negotiations in France. Hence the use of passive voice (“the violence continued...”), so absurdly; it is not the terrorists who perpetrated the violence; rather, violence somehow perpetrated itself.

Another absurd claim in this part of the Indictment is that the “forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo Albanian villages and towns. Such phrasing suggests to the public that terrorists and their actions are wholly nonexistent in Kosovo-Metohija, so that the “forces of the FRY and Serbia” have nothing to do but attack the peaceful citizens of “Kosovo Albanian villages and towns,” out of sheer impunity or some other irrational motivation.

What was really happening in Kosovo-Metohija during, for example, mid-to-late February 1999, becomes obvious from the orders of the Pristina Corps (PrK) headquarters [Classified # 455-1, 16 February 1999] to “destroy the Albanian terrorist forces in the area of Malo Kosovo; Drenica; Malisevo” (marked on 1:50 000 map,  sections: Novi Pazar - 4, Kursumlija - 3,4, Kosovska Mitrovica - 1, 2, 3 and 4, Pristina - 1, 2, 3. and 4, and Prizren - 1. i 2).

In section 1, this order defines the “enemy”:

Albanian terrorist forces (ATF) have been reorganized, rearmed with modern weapons and equipment, and trained for continued combat operations against the FRY forces.

ATF strongholds are the areas of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, Malisevo and ‘Salja & Bajgora’, where they have establish zones of operation (ZO) ‘Lab’ (some 1800-2000 Albanian terrorists/AT); ‘Drenica’ (25,000 AT), ‘Drim-Pastrik’ (some 1500 AT),  and ‘Salja & Bajgora’ (some 600-800 AT), totaling some 6,800 armed terrorists in four zones of operation:

-         LAB’: Three “KLA” brigades (151st, numbering 300, with a command post (CP) in Bradas, with special force of 80-90 terrorists; 152nd, numbering 400, CP in Konjusevac; 153rd , numbering 180, CP in Zlas). CP of the ZO "Lab" is in the village of Lapastica.

Local militia units, numbering 60-100 terrorists, are deployed in the villages of Godisnjak, Brabonjic, Vaganica, and Slavkovce.

-         SALJA & BAJGORA: two “KLA” brigades (141st, numbering 200, CP in Smrekovica; 142nd, numbering 250, CP in Sipolje). CP of the ZO ‘Salja & Bajgora’, with a special force of 70-80 terrorists, is in Bajgora.

-         ‘"DRENICA’: five brigades (111th Special Brigade, numbering 300, CP in Gradica; 112th, numbering 450, CP in Likovac; 113th, numbering 300, CP in Donje Prekaze; 114th, numbering 300, CP in Glogovac; 140th, numbering 300, CP in Srbica).

CP of ZO ‘Drenica’ is in Likovac, with a special force of 70-80 terrorists in Vocnjak.

Local militia units, numbering 50-70 terrorists each, deployed in Turicevac, Trtevac, Domanek, and Krajkovo. Armed sentries (100-150 terrorists) in Gladno Selo, Likosane, Prelovac and Trstenik.

The “KLA” counts on armed villagers (some 30-50 men) in the villages along Mt. Cicavica, Drenica, Prekaz and Gornja Drenica.

-         DRIM-PASTRIK’: two brigades (122nd, numbering 250, deployed in Drenovac; CP and special force of 70-80 terrorists, also in Drenovac; 124th, numbering 300, CP in Retimlje).

CP of the ZO and the “KLA” operational HQ in Maralija.

Local militia in villages of Dragobilje, Maralija, Gornje and Donjee Potocane, Naspale, Velika Krusa, Bace and Kravasarija. Armed sentries (30-50 terrorists) in Gajrak and on Mt. Milanovac.

The PrK orders then say:

“Objectives of the ATF are to capture military, economic and civilian targets, expand and link their zones of operation, spread the rebellion, create conditions for controlling the entire territory of Kosovo-Metohija and declare an independent Kosovo.

"The ATF are armed with automatic rifles, light and heavy machine guns (also mounted on vehicles), anti-tank weapons  ARMBRUST, RPG, ‘zolja’, ‘osa’ [FRY-made AT missiles], AT guns and both 60- and 82-mm mortars.

"Expect mortar fire from Gornja Lapastica, Bradas and Bajgora; Likovac, Marina, Gornje and Donje Obrinje, Vocnjak, Blace, Kravasarije, Pagarusa and Dragobilje.

"Expect ambushes of units and supply convoys on all roads. Observation posts and skirmishers are deployed well in front of main ATF strongholds. AFT strongholds are being fortified with trenches and firing positions.

"Expect residential areas to be booby-trapped (schools, homes, shops), roads and trails obstructed by mines, ditches and barricades.

"To slow down, trap and inflict casualties on VJ and MUP forces, the ATF mined the areas around Obrandza, Sibovac, Gornja Lapastica, Zatric, Malisevo, Orahovac, Sobina, Orlate, Crni Lug, Vrasevce, Likovac, Lapusnik, Marina, Trnavce, Gornja Klina.

"The following roads have also been mined: Grebno-Kramovik, Jablanica-Dasinovac-Decane; Donji Ratis-Rznic- Decane, Sedlare-Crnoljevo, Stimlje-Suva Reka, Stari Trg-Rasane, Opterusa- Zociste, Likovac-Pluzina.

"Recruitment stations are in the villages of Kravaserije, Ratimlje and Pagarusa. Urban terrorist training centers are in  Nisar, Ratimlje, and Pagarusa.

"We expect initial ATF resistance to VJ and MUP to be strong, but to fall off with casualties and loss of positions, eventually resulting in abandonment of strong points.”

Objectives of the 52nd, Pristina Corps, were specified in clear military terms in the following order:

"Objectives: in cooperation with Serbian MUP forces, surround, break and destroy ATF in the area of Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Malisevo. Simultaneously, secure the border towards Albania and Macedonia, prevent infiltration of ATF from Albania and Macedonia, secure military outposts, roads and territory.

"Part of our forces is to prevent the retreat of ATF from Malo Kosovo, Bajgora and Drenica to Mt. Cicavica, and from Malisevo to Baranski Lug and Mt. Jezero.

"Afterwards, secure the major communication routes and establish full control over Kosovo-Metohija territory."

Given the estimated enemy force, deployment of his own troops and the objectives, the PrK commander decided to:

Attack with the bulk of the force along the lines: Krpimej-Gornja Lastica-Majance; Komorane-Trstenik-Srbica, and Klina-Malisevo-Suva Reka, and detach forces to secure the border, military outposts, roads and territory.

"Goal of the operation is to surround the ATF in the area of Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Malisevo; together with the Serbian MUP forces, from the surrounding positions attack and destroy the ATF along all the axes of advance.

"Continue with heightened alert along the borders towards Albania and Macedonia, preventing the infiltration of ATF from these republics. Secure military outposts, communications and territory.

"Part of the forces will prevent the retreat of ATF from Malo Kosovo, Bajgora and Drenica to Mt. Cicavica, and from Malisevo to Baranski Lug and Mt. Jezero.

"Afterwards, secure the major communication routes and establish full control over Kosovo-Metohija territory.

"Operation to last between three and five days.”

Sections 10.2 and 10.6 of the same Order, both relating to security and psychological aspects of the operation, regulate the behavior towards captured terrorists, as well as civilians and their possessions:

"10.2. Security:

Captured terrorists shall be taken to the following POW camps:

"- units operating in Malo Kosovo will establish a POW collection point at the poultry farm in the village of Goles;

"- units operating in Malisevo will establish a POW collection point at the administrative compound of “TO Metohija vino” winery in Siroko near Suva Reka.

"- the Corps will establish a POW camp at the warehouse of “DP Vocar” in Gracanica.

"All units will escort prisoners from the collection points to the main POW camp using their own forces and transportation.

"During the operation, it is specifically forbidden of all VJ troops: to enter residential areas on their own accord; to loot the property of local civilian; to violate international laws and customs of war; and to move the enemy dead and their weapons before the arrival of appropriate authorities.

 

10.6. Moral/Psychological concerns, and Information:

“Individual soldiers are strictly forbidden to enter houses, and are to watch for possible surprise explosive devices.”

So, in “late February and early March” there was no “series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo Albanian villages and towns,” as the Indictment alleges, but an operation to destroy very strong “KLA” forces in the above mentioned areas. Even so, despite such heavy deployment of the terrorists inside villages and towns, orders from the PrK Headquarters specifically forbid individual entry into homes and require respect for international laws and customs of war.

The above-cited sections of PrK HQ orders are in full agreement with the Instruction by the VJ General Staff regarding the VJ procedures for preparation and execution of operations in Kosovo-Metohija, order # 100 of February 3, 1999, signed by Col.-Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic. This  Instruction, aside from the general guidelines and conclusions, contains four sections: 1) Preparations for conducting combat operations, 2) Procedures for preparing to conduct combat operations, 3) Procedures during combat operations and 4) Procedures after combat operations.

In its general guidelines, the Instruction sets a basic principle for all procedures during the preparation and execution of combat operations, to be followed to the letter. As its main principle, the Instruction asserts that “conduct of combat operations by VJ in endangered areas... must be thoroughly planned, organized, prepared, implemented, controlled and analyzed,” which means it excludes improvisation and initiative that would make enable individuals, groups or units to engage in behavior not approved or uncontrolled by their commanders and the Headquarters.

We shall discuss “command responsibility” of Col-Gen. D. Ojdanic in responding to the following, Paragraph 31 of the Indictment.

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