by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
57a. g Rs.
Berlin, November 30, 1941.
OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE Führer AND THE GRAND MUFTI of
JERUSALEM ON NOVEMBER 28,
1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER
GROBBA IN BERLIN
Grand Mufti began by thanking the Führer for the great honor he
had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity
to convey to the Führer of the Greater German Reich, admired by
the entire Arab world, his thanks for the sympathy which he had
always shown for the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause,
and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.
The Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win
the war and that the Arab cause would then prosper. The Arabs were
Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had
Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the Communists. They
were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their
hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only
negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the
instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the formation
of an Arab Legion. The Arabs could be more useful to Germany as
allies than might be apparent at first ;lance, both for
geographical reasons and because of the suffering inflicted upon
them by the English and the Jews. Furthermore, they had close
relations with all Moslem nations, of which they could make use in
behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion would be quite easy to
raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab countries and the
prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in
Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight.
Of Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only
because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and
military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could
never award the victory to an unjust cause.
this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence arid
unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest
ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Führer and looked to his hand for the balm on their wounds
which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.
Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Germany,
which stated that Germany was holding no Arab, territories. and
understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and
freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the
Jewish national home
public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its
propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would
rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new
courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly
organizing the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At
the same time, he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in
strict discipline patiently wait for the right moment and only
strike upon an order from Berlin.
regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the Arabs in
that country certainly had by no means been incited by Germany to
attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a direct
English assault upon their honor.
Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an Arab
government in the neighboring territories because they would
prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the
neighboring countries, and, being .themselves a nation of 7
millions ,2 they had moreover nothing
to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan,
Iraq, and Palestine.
likewise would have no objections to the unification plan because
she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had
given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under King
Faisal as early as 1933.
these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Führer make a
public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which is so
powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their hearts
the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were not pressing
for immediate realization of their aspirations; they could easily wait
half a year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a
hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that the
English would be the gainers from it.
Führer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these
questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear.
Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That
naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home
a reference to the letter of Apr. 8, 1941, printed in vol. XII of
this series, document No. 293.
Thus in the original. It should read 17 millions.
was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the
exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was
also aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the
function of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work
there was done only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was
resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other
to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time direct a
similar appeal to non-European nations as well.
was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle with
two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia.
Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism
and Soviet Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both
countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive
struggle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main
as a conflict between Germany and England, but ideologically it
was a battle between National Socialism and the Jews. It went
without saying that Germany would furnish positive and practical
aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic
promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in
which the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for
aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little help
sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated
plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not
permitted the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In
spite of all the sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient
and Iraq was overcome by the power of Britain, that is, the
guardian of the Jews.
Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the
struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the
Arab world. The Führer therefore had to think and speak coolly and
deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the
leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to
help in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also
for the Arabs, would have to be done. Anything, however, that
might contribute to weakening the military situation must be put
aside, no matter how unpopular this move might be.
was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gateway to the
northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly with regard
to maintaining the supply, which was most difficult as a result of
the destruction of railroads and highways as well as of the
oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Führer were to raise the
problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which
were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They
would interpret the Führer's declaration as an intention to break
up France's colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen
ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
should rather make common cause with the English to try to save
what still could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria
would in France be understood to refer to the French colonies in
general, and that would at the present time create new troubles in
western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed
forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be available
for the campaign in the east.
Führer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoining
him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart
He (the Führer) would carry on the battle to the total destruction
of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe.
At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but which
in any event was not distant, the German armies would in the
course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.
As soon as this had happened, the Führer would on his own give the
Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived.
Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the
Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of
British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most
authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. It would then be his
task to set off the Arab operations which he had secretly
prepared. When that time had come, Germany could also be
indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration.
Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov,
it would be also the beginning of the end of the British world
empire. He (the Führer) hoped that the coming year would make it
possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the
Middle East. For the good of their common cause, it would be
better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months
than if Germany were to create difficulties for herself without
being able thereby to help the Arabs.
(the Führer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for a
public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But
he would beg him to consider that he (the Führer) himself was the
Chief of State of the German Reich for 5 long years during which
he was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of its
liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could
be made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of
arms that the Anschluss had been carried out.
moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had made
their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal
requested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.
Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would
come to pass just as the Führer had indicated. He was fully
reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard from the
Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not
be possible. secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with
Germany of the kind he had just outlined for the Fuhrer.
The Fuhrer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti
precisely that confidential declaration.
The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that
he was taking his leave from the Fuhrer in full confidence and
with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.
secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany of the
kind he had just outlined for the Führer.
Führer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti
precisely that confidential declaration.
Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that he
was taking his leave from the Führer in full confidence and with
reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.